The safety design is very important to civil aircraft. In order to verify the civil aircraft design whether meet the requirement of airworthiness regulation about the hazards to an airplane in the event of uncontained turbine engine rotor failure, which require the design measures to minimize the hazards in the case of uncontained turbine engine rotor failure. Airworthiness compliance verification method is presented in this paper .Firstly, in the cause of uncontained rotor fragments bursting out, the hazards validation method is proposed based on the results of airplane level functional hazard analysis (FHA) and fault tree analysis (FTA) in this paper. Secondly, airworthiness compliance verification procedure is developed. Thirdly, quantitative assessment model of hazards caused is proposed and calculated. Finally, an example show the whole airworthiness compliance verification procedure include hazards validation, quantitative calculation and airworthiness compliance verdict Results show that the hazard combinations resulting in multiple systems failure can be identified, thus providing more sufficient basis for airplane design improvement to minimize the hazards caused by uncontained engine rotor failure.
Introduction
Uncontained turbine engine rotor failure (UERF) is one of typical particular risks threatening aircraft [1] . The uncontained fragments busting out from engine with high velocity can penetrate fuselage, fuel tanks, system components and other engines of the airplane, and it is highly possible that uncontained rotor failure cause catastrophic accident. Research has shown that it is unlikely to eliminate uncontained rotor failure completely, hence airplane design specifications require that design precautions are taken to minimize the hazard from such events [2] [3] [4] [5] .
The Advisory Circular 20-128A "Design Considerations for Minimizing Hazards Caused by Uncontained Turbine Engine and Auxiliary Power Unit Rotor Failure" of Federal Aviation Administration provides accepted design precautions, safety analysis method and applicable probability level of catastrophic hazards [6] . The safety analysis method identifies catastrophic hazards within the impacted area of airplane by establishing "Functional Hazard Tree" or "System Matrix", however, the method could omits some potential hazard combinations of components likely when analyzing catastrophic functional hazard involving multiple systems in the case of multiple fragments bursting out. In order to identify potential catastrophic hazards to an airplane more completely in the event of UERF, a method based on the results of airplane level functional hazard analysis (FHA) and using fault tree analysis (FTA) is proposed in this paper.
This paper provides an improved method for calculating the occurrence probability of catastrophic hazard caused by uncontained engine rotor failure. To the uncontained failure model of single fragment and multiple fragments, the catastrophic hazard probability calculation model for single rotor stage and mean probability calculation model for airplane are provided separately.
Definition and assumptions

Uncontained turbine engine failure model
Uncontained turbine engine failure model is a model describing the characteristics of uncontained fragments, including the size, mass, spread angle, energy and number shown in table 1. The fragment spread angle of specific type determines the impact area of the fragment. Table 1 Uncontained turbine engine failure model [6, 7] Type Maximum dimension Mass Spread angle 1/3 disc fragment 1/3*b+ R 1/3 bladed disc mass ±3º
Intermediate fragment 1/3*(b+ R) 1/30 bladed disc mass ±5º
Alternative fragment 1/3*b+ R 1/3 disc mass ±5º
Small fragments 1/2*b (tip part) 1/2 blade mass ±15º
Fan blade fragment 1/3*c (tip part) 1/3 fan blade ±15º
Note: 1) b=blade length, R=disc radius, c＝fan blade length (less blade root & platform). 2) Alternative fragment is an alternative to the model of 1/3 disc fragment and intermediate fragment.
Assumptions
The UERF hazard identification and quantitative calculation base on the assumptions as following: 1) The fragment is considered to possess infinite energy, to be capable of severing lines, wiring, cables and unprotected structure in its path [6] ; 2) Uncontained fragments will not burst out independently from more than one rotor stage or engine at the same time; 3) Fragment travels along a trajectory path that is tangential to the fragment centroid locus in the direction of rotor rotation, and to be undeflected from its original trajectory unless deflection shields are fitted (protective shielding or an engine being impacted may be assumed to have sufficient mass to stop even the most energetic fragment) [6] ; 4) Fragment rotates about its centroid without tumbling and sweeps a path equal to twice the greatest radius that can be struck from the fragment centroid that intersects its periphery [6] ; 5)The probability of rotor failure is assumed to be 1.0 for each of all rotor stages. For the analysis the individual risk(s) from each rotor stage of the engine should be assessed and tabled.6) The probability of release of debris within the maximum spread angle is uniformly distributed over all directions [6] ; 7) Independent failures of critical components will not occur during uncontained rotor failure period.
UERF Hazard identification method
Basic idea of the method
Since there are a large number of components located in UERF impact area, if a manner from component level to airplane function level is taken, the hazard identification need analyze the effect combinations of multiple fragment swept paths, thus resulting in a large work and missing some potential catastrophic hazards likely. Based on the analysis above, a manner from airplane function level to component level is considered. First determine the catastrophic functional hazards caused by UERF within all rotor stage impact area. Then establish UERF fault tree and obtain the minimal cut sets resulting in catastrophic failure conditions on the airplane. Finally, analyze each minimal cut for every rotor stage. A minimal cut set will be considered as a UERF hazard if the minimal cut set can be triggered by uncontained fragment or multiple fragments from the same rotor stage.
Functional hazard identification
Based on the results of aircraft level functional hazard analysis (FHA), the functional hazard identification is performed with every second level function of aircraft function list as a unit. A second level function will be excluded if the function has no failure condition with a catastrophic effect, or at last one of the necessary components performing the function is located without the impact areas of all rotor stages. Then the second level functions remained in aircraft function list are the objectives that need to analysis in detail. Furthermore, the functional hazard identification should refer to airplane fault tree, and supplement structural functional hazard and other functional hazard omitted likely.
UERF FAULT TREE
The top event of UERF fault tree is catastrophic failure conditions of airplane. The direct causes resulting in top event are losses of critical functions of airplane, and the fundamental causes are combination of component failures. Connect the top event and functional hazard events determined by the functional hazard identification with boolean logic gates, and the upper tiers of UERF fault tree are developed. Then analyze the causes of each functional hazard down through successively more detailed levels of the system design until the root causes are component failures, and the primary UERF fault tree are established, shown in figure 1. Thought simplifying the fault tree and determining minimal cut sets, the causes and failure paths of the top event within impact area of all rotor stages are obtained. According to the assumption 2.2, not all minimal cut sets can be triggered by the fragment or fragments from each rotor stage due to the scatter of the basic events constituting a minimal cut set within different impact areas of rotor stages. To the uncontained failure model of single one-third disc fragment, intermediate fragment and three one-third fragments required to have a quantitative assessment in AC20-128A, an analysis form is established for each engines as shown in table 2. Give a mark as √ under the uncontained model and rotor stage to a minimal cut set if the basic events constituting the minimal cut set can be triggered by the uncontained failure model (or triggering model) under the rotor stage, else give a mark as ×. As part of the UERF safety analysis, qualitative assessment will be performed to the minimal cut sets with mark as √. 
Triggering analysis
UERF hazard identification process
A UERF hazard identification process includes the following steps: 1) Determine UERF impact area. Include every impact areas of all rotor stage and fan.
2) Determine systems and components that can be affected.
3) Functional hazard identification. Identify the critical functional hazards based on the results of airplane level functional hazard analysis (FHA).
4) UERF fault tree analysis. Include establishing UERF fault tree and determining minimal cut sets. 5) Triggering analysis. A minimal cut set will be a UERF hazard if the minimal cut set can be triggered by (multiple) uncontained rotor debris from the same rotor stage.
6) Form UERF hazard list. Include constitution, fight phase, triggering model and rotor stage to a hazard.
Quantitative assessment model of hazard caused by UERF
The quantitative assessment of hazards base on the 2.2 assumptions.
Catastrophic hazard probability calculation model for single rotor stage
1) The cause of single fragment Assume that an airplane powered by E engines (APU analyzed separately), the number of rotor stages 2)The cause of multiple fragments The probability calculation model of the catastrophic hazards caused by multiple fragments of the rotor stage u within the impact area of rotor stage u of engine e can be represented as follow. 
Where K is the number of types of fragments in an uncontained event; M is the total number of fragments in an uncontained event; k M is the number of k -type fragments in an uncontained event; t is one of the necessary sweeping paths in which catastrophic hazard h is triggered; t N is the number of basic events located in sweeping path t ， and the basic events constitute part of catastrophic hazard h ; T is the number of the necessary sweeping paths in which catastrophic hazard h is triggered, h N ≥T ≥1. 
Catastrophic hazard mean probability calculation model for airplane
1) The cause of single fragment To the uncontained failure model of single fragment, based on the assessments for each rotor stage of each engine, the catastrophic hazards mean probability for airplane is 2 2
2) The cause of multiple fragments To the uncontained failure model of multiple fragments, the catastrophic hazards mean probability for airplane is
UERF airworthiness compliance verification rules
In order to show that the new design aircraft is compliance with airworthiness regulation, the two rules [6] followed must be proved by different methods, such as design drawings, calculation, simulation, analysis, etc.
1) Practical design precautions have been taken to minimize the damage that can be caused by uncontained engine debris. The design precautions must be included the followed but not limited to:
a) The key components, system and structure will be out of the UERF impact area; b) The key components, system and structure will be redundancy, separate (the separate distance is at least equal to the max diameter of 1/3 rotor disc )and isolated design measures if the components , structure and system was inevitable in the UERF impact area;
c) The key components, system and structure will be sheltered from each kind of UERF debris; d) The key structure will be taken multi-direction force transfer structure and crack arrest design measures and damage tolerance analysis.
2) Acceptable risk levels, see table 4, as specified in AC 20-128A, Paragraph 10, have been achieved for each critical Failure Model. 
EXAMPLE
An analysis is performed on a small generic business jet.
Practical design precautions verification
Practical design precautions have been taken to minimize the damage that can be caused by uncontained engine debris. and the design measures must be proved by different methods, such as design drawings, calculation, simulation, analysis, etc.
UERF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
1) Determine UERF impact area. The jet is powered by a turbofan engine mounted on root of vertical stabilizer behind the aft pressure bulkhead. The UERF impact area of the jet is shown in figure 4 .
2) Determine systems and components can be impact. The impacted systems and structures include flight control system, fuel system, fire protection system, powerplant, horizontal stabilizer, vertical stabilizer and tail cone. The elevator and rudder are controlled respectively by two separate cable systems.
3) Functional hazard identification. The catastrophic functional hazards of the jet are shown in table 5.
4) UERF fault tree analysis. Establish UERF fault tree of the jet is shown in figure 5 , and the definition of the failure events are shown in table 6 and table 7 . Obtain nineteen minimal cut sets include {B1, B3}, {B1, B4}, {B2, B3}, {B2, B3}, etc. 6) Analysis result. In the impact areas of all rotor stages, eleven catastrophic hazards are identified. There is no catastrophic hazard to single intermediate fragment model and small fragments model, one catastrophic hazard to single one-third disc fragment model, and there are eleven catastrophic hazards to three one-third disc fragments. Analysis shows that the UERF catastrophic hazards of the jet have been identified effectively. These hazards should be quantified, if the final hazard probability is not beyond acceptable level, then the design of the jet meet the UERF safety requirements, else appropriate preventive measures should be taken. Table 7 Example of the UERF hazard identification
QUANTITATIVE CALCULATION
The jet is powered by a turbofan engine mounted on root of vertical stabilizer behind the aft pressure bulkhead. The engine consists of fourteen rotor stages: the fan and three-stage low-pressure compressor (LPC1-3), five-stage high-pressure compressor (HPC1-5), high-pressure turbine (HPT1) and four-stage low-pressure turbine (TPL1-4). 1) Input information. The quantitative assessment of hazards is based on the results of hazard identification. Method of UERF hazard identification reference AC20-128A or related papers. Through the UERF hazard identification to the jet, eleven catastrophic hazards are identified in the impact areas of all rotor stages. See table 8. There is no catastrophic hazard to single intermediate fragment model and small fragments model, one catastrophic hazard to single one-third disc fragment model, and there are eleven catastrophic hazards to three one-third disc fragments. Note: D is single one-third disc fragment, and 3D is three one-third disc fragments. 2) Catastrophic hazard probability calculation for Single Rotor Stage. To each uncontained failure model required in AC20-128A, calculate the probability of catastrophic hazards within the impact area of each rotor stage, and the result as shown in table 9.
3) Catastrophic hazard mean probability calculation for airplane. Calculate the mean probability of catastrophic hazards for all rotor stages to each uncontained failure model, and the catastrophic hazard probability for aircraft can be obtained, as shown in table 10. Comparing with the applicable criteria provided in AC20-128A, the result of quantitative assessment is within an acceptable range, thus showing that the design of the jet meet the requirements to minimize the hazards to an airplane in the event of uncontained engine rotor failure. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a method based on the results of airplane level functional hazard analysis (FHA) and using fault tree analysis (FTA) is proposed to identify UERF hazards, especially in the cause of multiple uncontained rotor fragments bursting out. Meanwhile， an advanced method for calculating occurrence probability of catastrophic hazards caused by uncontained aero-engine rotor failure based on AC20-128A is presented. The improved method considers the cases fully that multiple uncontained rotor fragments burst out, and that several critical components are located in same path of single fragment, thus providing more accurate assessment for uncontained engine rotor failure. Finally, an example shows that the method is validity, thus providing more sufficient basis for UERF safety design improvement.
